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Evolution of gossip-based indirect 
reciprocity on a bipartite network
Francesca Giardini1,2 & Daniele Vilone1,3
Cooperation can be supported by indirect reciprocity via reputation. Thanks to gossip, reputations are 
built and circulated and humans can identify defectors and ostracise them. However, the evolutionary 
stability of gossip is alegedly undermined by the fact that it is more error-prone that direct observation, 
whereas ostracism could be inefective if the partner selection mechanism is not robust. The aim of 
this work is to investigate the conditions under which the combination of gossip and ostracism might 
support cooperation in groups of diferent sizes. We are also interested in exploring the extent to 
which errors in transmission might undermine the reliability of gossip as a mechanism for identifying 
defectors. Our results show that a large quantity of gossip is necessary to support cooperation, and that 
group structure can mitigate the efects of errors in transmission.
Cooperation among individuals is essential for their survival, in human and animal societies. Human beings are 
an intrinsicaly social species and most of our evolutionary success can be atributed to our highly developed 
ability to cooperate with each other. his ability is especialy important in groups, where individuals need to coor-
dinate their actions in order to achieve personal beneits that cannot be obtained without cooperation. However, 
those who do not contribute but reap the colective beneits are beter of than cooperators1.
In models of indirect reciprocity2–4, cooperation can thrive when information about others is acquired either 
via direct observation, or via “image score”, a reliable and publicly visible indication of one’s past cooperative 
behaviour5. When modeled as simple scores, pro-social reputations are evolutionary stable only if they track 
behaviour with the same accuracy as direct experience6. Cooperation becomes fragile when errors are possi-
ble, that is, when there is an even smal probability for an individual to record a good partner as a bad one or 
vice-versa7.
Image score is efective in supporting group cooperation, but only when group size of individuals playing a 
Public Goods Game (PGG) does not exceed four8. When group size increases, there is a concomitant decrease in 
the frequency of cooperation, showing that indirect reciprocity, even when supported by an image score mech-
anism, is not efective in large groups. he authors explain this decline in cooperation as due to the diiculty of 
observing reputations of many individuals in large communities. However, when agents are placed on a bipartite 
graph and they can actively select their group members, image score becomes efective in sustaining cooperation, 
even for groups of 20 individuals9.
Notwithstanding its efectiveness in supporting cooperation in models of indirect reciprocity, image score is 
limited by its reliance on direct observation. hanks to language, humans are able to overcome this limitation 
and can exchange information about each other, thus isolating defectors and selecting cooperative partners10,11.
hanks to gossip, we can map our social group12, learn about its rules13, and enforce social norms14, among 
other things. Gossip is crucial to make information about known cheaters travel within the network, thus alow-
ing for identiication of defectors, and it has a strong inluence on the behaviour of participants in an economic 
experiment, even when they can rely on direct observation of others’ actions15.
Gossip is also relatively more efective than punishment in promoting cooperation across a four-round PGG, it 
increases participants’ gains and also eiciency, whereas punishment signiicantly decreases participants’ earnings16. 
In a computational study, gossipers who could actively select their group members and avoid il-reputed agents 
are able to outperform free-riders and punishers in groups of 25 agents, whereas in smaler groups the combina-
tion of gossiping and material punishment is more successful in increasing cooperation levels9.
However, the evolutionary stability of gossip in supporting cooperation has been questioned. According to 
Nowak and Sigmund17, one of the main limitations of gossip consists in its being unreliable, while Ohtsuki, Iwasa 
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and Nowak18 assume that errors in observing interactions, and the resulting unreliable reputations, inevitably 
cause gossip-based indirect reciprocity to colapse.
he aim of this study is to investigate the impact of gossip quantity and quality on cooperation levels in a 
population of artiicial agents playing a PGG on a bipartite network. In a bipartite graph the mesoscopic level of 
the interactions is beter depicted19,20 than in a classical one-mode network, and it also makes group choices more 
relevant. As an ilustration, two individuals belonging to the same three groups are “more” connected than two 
other individuals who share the membership of a single group, so that in this way it is possible to take into account 
also the quality and the weight of the connections (indeed, a similar result can be obtained by means of weighted 
networks, which however do not represent explicitly the group structure21 underlying the network). Indeed, this 
kind of representation of the relations among individuals has been already shown to be more eicient when the 
interactions considered are competitive, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game or the PGG itself22,23.
Embedding agents into a bipartite graph alows us to investigate the relationship between gossip and ostra-
cism. his form of punishment, deined as being ignored or excluded by another individual or group of indi-
viduals24, is efective in promoting cooperative behaviours, favouring investments in the colective goods and 
maintaining social order25,26. Maier-Rigaud and coleagues27 show that in laboratory experiments, participants in 
a PGG with ostracism opportunities can increase contribution levels and, unlike monetary punishment, ostra-
cism also has a signiicant positive efect on net earnings. In groups and smal-scale societies, ostracism can 
result from being negatively gossiped about14,28–30, and a combination of these two mechanisms could efectively 
support cooperation. In a laboratory experiment, Feinberg and coleagues show that a combination of gossip and 
ostracism leads to restore the colective good at the end of the game, ater an initial shrinking of group earnings31.
Given our interest for gossip in human societies, we also consider essential to investigate the relative efects 
of two ways of misreporting information about others. We do not distinguish here between malicious gossip, as 
intentionaly misreported information, and random noise, and we focus only on the later. However, we reckon 
that the direction of misreporting should be taken into account. A cooperator can be considered as a cheater, 
and then excluded from the interaction, or a defector could be erroneously included among cooperators. he 
former is an exclusion error, while the later is an inclusion error and litle is known about their respective efects 
on cooperation.
We developed a model of gossip-based cooperation with the aim of addressing two main chalenges related to 
the evolution of cooperation: 1. he impact of quantity and quality of gossip; and 2. he efect of network struc-
ture. In order to test whether privately exchanged information could support the emergence of cooperation we 
designed an agent-based model in which agents were embedded into groups composed by a ixed amount of play-
ers who could select a number of new players depending on direct experience and on reputational information 
acquired through gossip. he game consisted of a sequence of PGG rounds and gossip rounds, going from 1 to 5. 
he longer this sequence, the more gossip information agents could exchange in order to update other agents’ 
reputations. We also introduced errors in transmission, in order to test whether and to what extent cooperators 
could survive when information about cheaters was not reliable. We measured how the levels of cooperation 
and the average reputation of the agents varied in response to the quantity and reliability of gossip, as wel as in 
response to the severity of ostracism.
Results
We performed our simulations with diferent values of the model parameters F, n, M, gp, qα, qβ and qαβ: these parameters wil be precisely deined in the Methods section, anyway they are already summarized in Table 1. he 
results presented here are al averaged over 2000 independent realizations.
he variables of interest for understanding the efects of gossip and ostracism on cooperation are the average 
cooperator density ρ (i.e., the fraction of agents adopting the strategy C in the population), and the average rep-
utation S. he later indicates the average value of the average score each agent has of the others over the entire 
population:
∑σ σ= = − .S ij LL ij(,)
1
( 1) (,) (1)ij ij, ,
In general, such quantities evolve in time (i.e., through generations), so that we specify them as ρ(t) and S(t). 
Also their inal values ρ∞ and S∞, are taken into consideration in the description of the results.
Variable Description Notes
M number of groups ∈ N
n size of groups ∈ N
F fraction of ixed group members ∈ [0,  1]
L total size of the system L = nFM
qα probability of excluding errors ∈ [0,  1]
qβ probability of including errors ∈ [0,  1]
qαβ probability of bidirectional errors ∈ [0,  1]
Table 1.  Summary of the model parameters.
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Figure 1 (let graph) shows the inal density of cooperators as a function of the fraction of ixed members in 
PGG groups, F, for two diferent values of n and gp = 5. In large groups, ful cooperation is achieved when gossip is abundant (gp = 5). In smaler groups, the inal cooperation level remains high for smaler values of F, but goes to zero when F increases. When the opportunities for partner choice are limited, cooperation levels dramaticaly 
decrease as F increases. Figure 1 (let graph) shows the importance of the partner selection mechanism: when F 
becomes large enough to increase the number of ixed members in each PGG group then the inal cooperation 
level goes down. For example, with n = 4, ρ∞ undergoes a step-like reduction at F = 0.25 (ixed members increase 
from 1 to 2), F = 0.5 (ixed members from 2 to 3), until the inal cooperation disappears for F ≥ 0.75, when al the 
four components of a group are permanent and there is no more partner selection. he same thing happens with 
diferent values of n. It is worth noticing that in the baseline version of the model, without partner choice (F = 1) 
and a single gossip exchange (gp = 1), cooperative behaviours get rapidly extinct for both smal and large group size ater few generations, and the average reputation (as already stated, completely irrelevant for the evolution of 
the system) is negative.
Also the amount of gossip exchanged plays a crucial role in supporting cooperation: Fig. 1 (right graph) shows 
the behaviour of the inal cooperator density as a function of n for L = 200, F = 0.5, and three diferent values of 
gp. Without gossip, cooperation cannot be sustained for any value of n, but when there are enough gossip phases (in particular, gp = 5), cooperation survives already for n ≥ 3.Finaly, in the right graph of Fig. 2 we show results for systems where only agents with non-negative reciprocal 
reputation exchange information. he behaviour looks identical to the one in the previous Figure, but the inal 
cooperation decreases more rapidly with F, and goes to zero with smal or nul partner selection for large group 
size. his means that also information spread by defectors can be useful for the emergence of cooperative behav-
iours at a global level, and keeping them away from gossip limits the emergence of pro-social strategies.
If we include the possibility of partner selection (i.e., by seting F < 1) without gossip (i.e., keeping gp = 1), each group wil be formed by nF ixed members which choose the missing group members n(1 − F) at each round of 
the game. As we can observe in Fig. 3, also in this case cooperation goes to zero at the end of the dynamics, even 
though less switly than in the previous modality with F = 1.
he evolution of cooperation depends strongly on both n and gp, as shown in Fig. 4. Increasing both group size and the number of gossip stages makes cooperation thrive: the more individuals exchange information, the beter 
they know each other so that they are able to avoid defectors when completing their own group in the PGG stages. 
Figure 1. Let igure: inal cooperator density as a function of the fraction F of ixed members of the PGG 
groups for gp = 5, n = 4, 10 and 20, M = 100 for n = 4, M = 40 for n = 10, and M = 20 for n = 20; perfect information. Right igure: inal cooperator density as a function of the group size n for L = 200, F = 0.5, and 
gp = 1, 3, 5; perfect information (no errors). Please notice that we have L = nFM.
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Figure 2. Final cooperator density as a function of the fraction F of ixed members of the PGG groups for 
gp = 5, n = 4, 10 and 20, M = 100 for n = 4, M = 40 for n = 10, and M = 20 for n = 20, with gossip only among agents having good reputation of each other. Perfect information.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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herefore, even though in a single PGG defectors might gain more than cooperators, if there is enough informa-
tion lowing, defectors are quickly isolated, therefore they are accepted in fewer groups and gain lower payofs.
he emergence of cooperation is mirrored also in average reputation. Average reputation converges to a neg-
ative value when cooperation gets extinct, and to a positive one when cooperators invade the system. Figures 3 
(right graph) and 5 show that the inal average reputation increases when three conditions are met: if the number 
of gossip phases increases, if partner selection becomes harsher and, inaly, if the group size also decreases.
Concerning the entire distributions of image score values, these are reported in Fig. 6. As we can observe, 
when cooperation disappears, every non-zero score is negative (of course, there are only defectors). At the same 
time, when cooperators invade completely the system the non-zero scores are always positive; when instead the 
inal coniguration is a mixed one, the inal score distribution is closer to a symmetric one.
In summary, it is the combination of gossip quantity and partner selection harshness that makes cooperation 
survive. When there is not enough gossip to support partner selection (gp = 1), cooperation gets always extinct for any group size; on the other hand, as the number of gossip exchanges increases, the probability of invasion by 
cooperators increases as wel.
he eicacy of gossip in supporting cooperation is limited by its reliability, but litle is known about the efect 
of speciic kinds of errors. In a situation in which the listener can misunderstand what the speaker says, there are 
two possible outcomes. An exclusion error occurs when, with probability qα, a gossip targets a player with positive reputation which is understood as negative by the listener. In a complementary way, an inclusion error refers to the 
probability qβ that a player with negative reputation is mistakenly considered a cooperator.
Figure 3. Time behaviour of cooperators density (let) and average reputation (right) for M = 100, n = 4, 
20, and F = 0.5, 0.75 with no gossip efect. Perfect information.
Figure 4. Time behaviour of the cooperator density for n = 4(let) and n = 20 (right), with L = 200, F = 0.5 
and diferent number gp of gossip phases. Perfect information.
Figure 5. Time behaviour of the average reputation for n = 4(let) and n = 20 (right), with L = 200, F = 0.5 
and diferent number gp of gossip phases. Perfect information.
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With exclusion errors cooperators can stil outcompete defectors for n = 20, and they do not afect survival 
of contributors up to almost qα = 0.5 for n = 4 (Fig. 7, upper-let graph). his can be explained by the fact that in partner selection excluding defectors is essential, therefore, even though also some cooperators are excluded with 
qα > 0, defectors are rejected as usual. In this sense we could say that the Latin moto “in dubio pro reo” should be reversed (“in dubio in reum”) in order to maintain high levels of cooperation in the population. Although not 
shown in the igure, we also veriied that the time needed to reach the inal state is of the same order of magnitude 
as in the case of perfect information transmission.
Inclusion errors take place when negative reputations are understood by the listener as positive, i.e., a defector 
gains a positive reputation with probability qβ. Indeed, as we veriied in our simulation, inclusion errors are more detrimental to cooperation with respect to the exclusion ones, since they alow defectors to be accepted by difer-
ent groups despite their anti-social behaviour, thus lowering the global level of cooperation in the system. his is 
clear in the upper-right graph of Fig. 7.
Figure 6. Final reputation score distributions for systems with L = 200, F = 0.5 and (a) n = 4and gp = 2, (b) n = 4and gp = 5, (c) n = 20 and gp = 5. Perfect information.
Figure 7. Final cooperator densities as a function of the transmission error probabilities qα (top let), qβ (top right), and qαβ (down) for L = 200 (L = 201 for n = 6), F = 0.5; gp = 5and n = 2, 4, 6. he case n = 2, a PDG where the second player is accepted by the irst one, is shown just as baseline.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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In this work we focused mainly in the case qαqβ = 0because our aim is to analyse separately the role and efect of each kind of errors. Anyway, in the real world errors (deliberate or not) can happen in both ways. herefore, we 
tested what happens when every information, no mater if positive or negative, can be wrongly transmited with 
probability qαβ. As reported in the lower graphics of Fig. 7, we see that in this case the average inal cooperation level is even lower than in the coniguration with inclusion errors. his means that, if an exclusion error is not 
hindering the global cooperation because the key point is preventing defectors to be accepted in other groups, 
bidirectional errors have the worst global efects because they decrease the reliability of information overal.
Discussion
Gossip is a key ingredient for the functioning of human societies, but its importance in evolutionary models of 
cooperation has been largely underrated. he present research contributes to our understanding of the role of gos-
sip as an inexpensive but efective way of supporting cooperation in groups of varying size. Privately exchanged 
information helps cooperators inding and rejecting defectors, and this positive efect is reinforced when ostra-
cism from the group is possible. Along with the structure of the interaction, the quantity of gossip plays a crucial 
role. he more information agents can exchange, the more accurate they become in selecting reliable partners, 
even when groups are unstable. Our results also show that the role of gossip abundance is modulated by group 
size: in smal groups (n = 4) at least ive gossip stages are required to make cooperators outcompete defectors, 
whereas in large groups (n = 20) two gossip stages are suicient to colect and make good use of reported infor-
mation. his inding complements results obtained in lab experiments where the abundance of gossip is efective 
in optimizing human responses, and in directing cooperation towards cooperators in an indirect-reciprocity 
games32.
Image score is an efective solution for supporting cooperation, but unlike previous work on image score in 
groups33, we designed a model in which agents exchange private information, showing that the combination of 
gossip and partner selection makes cooperation invade the system also for large sizes of the groups, whilst in 
absence of these mechanisms the inal level of cooperation decreases with the group size8,9.
Gossip-based indirect reciprocity is expected to be not evolutionary stable if gossip is not completely reliable 
and accurate17, but the size of this efect is debatable. his study contributes to assess the importance of errors in 
transmission, showing that their efects are smaler than previously hypothesized, and that their disruptive power 
on reputation depends also on the kind of error. When unreliable information is introduced in the system, failing 
to exclude a defector is more detrimental to cooperation than erroneously ostracising a cooperator. his efect is 
ampliied by the interaction structure, because in the bipartite graph defectors are accepted by diferent groups 
despite their anti-social behaviour. Even with excluding errors, cooperation emerges slowly, but in groups of 20 
individuals it nonetheless goes to 1.
Unlike previous work7,34,35, we are not interested in errors in evaluations, which might consist in the applica-
tion of the wrong social norm, but in transmission errors and their efects on groups’ decision making. Pairing 
unreliable gossip with ostracism can lead either to ostracism against innocent cooperators or to acceptance of 
unrecognised defectors, and this work shows the diferent outcomes of these errors.
A possible limitation of our study is that we do not consider malicious gossip strategicaly used to reduce 
someone’s reputation. here is a good evidence that gossip includes both positive and negative talk and most 
interpersonal gossip is neutral or positive, as reported in diferent studies on every day conversations36. Duncan, 
Marriot, and Dunbar37 report that less than 5 percent of the conversations they analysed had malicious and 
manipulative gossip as a topic. A second reason why we did not insert any manipulative gossip is because we 
wanted to proceed in a stepwise fashion, irst testing whether privately exchanged information about an absent 
third party13,38 could be efective in an evolutionary model of cooperation. However, strategic gossip is an inter-
esting topic and we plan to address this limitation in our future work. Another interesting development of our 
work could be in adding the costs of gossiping, that in real life are expressed in terms of potential punishment by 
those who are gossiped about39,40.
Another crucial element for supporting cooperation is the interaction between group-size and a bipartite 
graph, whose combination is very efective in isolating defectors. According to Nowak and May41, in computa-
tional models of the evolution of cooperation, the structure of interactions among individuals could be important 
in enhancing cooperation even though at the individual level this strategy results detrimental. A great deal of 
studies on evolutionary game theory on graphs were spawned by this irst, key insight42–45, making it clear that 
many factors can favour, or hinder, global cooperative behaviours. When agents playing a PGG are placed on a 
bipartite graph with image score opportunities8, cooperation can emerge and be maintained, also for diferent 
group sizes9. When cooperation is framed as a Public Goods Game (PGG)1,46, cooperation can hardly be sus-
tained, unless costly punishment is provided47,48. Although efective in many contexts, punishment increases the 
amount of cooperation but not the average pay-of for the group49, and in repeated games cooperators who do not 
bear the costs of punishing defectors are beter of than cooperators who punish18. Placing agents on a bipartite 
graph alows us to test the efects of ostracism as a low-cost and efective form of punishment, but also to under-
stand whether a combination of gossip and ostracism might support the evolution of cooperation.
Early smal-scale experiments suggested that network topology may actualy enhance cooperative strategies 
in controled laboratory situations50–52. hough, larger-scale and more in-depth studies and reviews53–56 showed 
that there is no signiicant inluence of the interaction network on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in 
behavioural experiments using a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). Analogously, it was analyticaly demonstrated 
that bipartite networks with PGG are very efective in fostering pro-social behaviours19.
By linking the results on gossip, in terms of both quantity and quality, with the data on ostracism on a bipartite graph,  
we provide support for the role of gossip-based indirect reciprocity on the evolution of cooperative behaviours in groups.  
his inding has implications for the current debate on the evolution of cooperation, showing that more realistic 
mechanisms, like gossip and ostracism, can be as efective as more ideal-typical image score.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Methods
We consider a population of L individuals placed on a bipartite graph19,57–60, that is, a network containing two 
kinds of nodes denoting agents and groups, respectively. his implies that links can be established only between 
nodes of diferent types whereas no direct connection among individual agents is possible. An overview of the 
main parameters is presented in Table 1.
Network building. he network building proceeds as folows: given a value F ∈ (0, 1), we set nF initial mem-
bers for each group so that each individual belongs exclusively to one group. As an ilustration, consider the case 
with L = 150, n = 20 and F = 0.75 (then M = 10). his would mean that we have 15 agents in the irst group, other 
15 in the second one and so on until the last group is formed. hen, each group needs to be completed with a 
subset (1 − F) n = 5 of individuals selected from a pool of available candidates. Potential partners are randomly 
selected from the remaining population, but they can become members of that group if and only if group mem-
bers have, on average, a non-negative reputation σ of potential candidates. If the number of available partners 
(that is, candidates with non-negative average reputation) is not enough to complete the group, it wil be iled 
by random selection of new members. Reputations are expressed by means of integers: in general, σ(x, y) is the 
reputation that the individual y has in x’s eyes. Whenever an agent i interacts with an agent j during a PGG stage, 
their respective reputations are updated. If j has cooperated, σ(i, j) is increased by 1, otherwise is decreased by 1. 
his process is bilateral, thus the same happens to the other agent’s record σ(j, i) of j about i. here is no maximum 
nor minimum limit to the possible values that σ(i, j) can assume. his direct experience is also complemented by 
information exchanged during gossip stages (for details, see the description of the Gossip stage below). If there is 
nobody in the whole population with a non-negative average reputation, new members are accepted regardless 
of their standing.
L individuals are distributed into M groups, each group composed of n members playing a sequence of PGG 
and gossip phases. Each and every individual i is characterized by an innate strategy si, which can be either coop-eration (C), or defection (D). Moreover, each agent has private information about other individuals’ reputation, 
on the basis of direct interaction and gossip.
Initial conditions. At the onset of the simulation, strategies are randomly assigned to players, therefore we 
have on average 50% of cooperators and 50% of defectors. Reputations are set equal to zero: σin(i, j) = 0 ∀ i, j.
Dynamics. he dynamics consist of gp phases, each phase characterized by the combination of a game round folowed by a gossip round. In PGG rounds, cooperators contribute a quantity c > 0, whereas defectors contribute 
nothing. he total contribution in each group is multiplied by a factor nB and equaly shared among al group 
members, regardless of individual contributions. Each agent plays as many PGG rounds as the number of groups 
it belongs to, and the total itness of a player is the sum of the pay-of gained in each of its groups, with B = 0.85 
and c = 1as in the work by Suzuki and Akiyama8.
Gossip stage. Reputations are privately held beliefs that agents update on the basis of their direct observation 
and, when gossip is available, of the information they receive from another agent. herefore, in the gossip stage, 
agents interact in pairs where the irst one, i, acts as the “speaker” and the second, j, as the “listener”. he target 
of gossip is a third player l whose reputation σ(i, l) is communicated by i to j. he reputation of l is updated by 
averaging j's original knowledge with the newest:
σ σ σ σ→ = + .jl jl jl il(,) (,) [(,) (,)]/2 (2)new
Imperfect information. Since information transmission is prone to errors of several origins going from 
noise to opportunistic deception, we enriched the model by including two diferent kinds of errors. he irst ones 
are caled exclusion errors, which make cooperative individuals have a negative reputations, and inclusion errors, 
which make defectors have positive reputations. Exclusion errors are implemented as folows: if σ(i, l) > 0, that 
is, if l has a good reputation according to i, there is a probability qα that reputation transmission is wrong and the receiver, j understands the algebraic opposite of what is told, so that
σ σ σ σ→ = − .jl jl jl il(,) (,) [(,) (,)]/2 (3)new
On the contrary, we have an inclusion error when l has a negative reputation to i, and there is a probability qβ that j understands l is a cooperator, so that
σ σ σ σ→ = + .jl jl jl il(,) (,) [(,) (,)]/2 (4)new
In this work we assume that qα ⋅ qβ = 0, that is, both can be equal to zero but at most one of them can be pos-itive. his procedure is repeated 2νL times, so that each player happens to be on average ν times a speaker and ν 
times a listener. Here, we always assume ν = 50. Moreover, in order to investigate the ful range of efects of errors, 
we also tested bidirectional errors, where with probability qαβ the same process described in Eq. 3 is applied.New group members are selected before each of the gp game rounds. It is important to stress that, if gp = 1, then gossip has no efect on the dynamics of the population.
Reproduction. Ater gp game-gossip phases, the reproduction stage takes place. Reproduction is modeled as binary tournament selection8. Two individuals are randomly selected from the overal population (parents) and a 
new individual (ofspring) is created. he ofspring inherits the strategy of the parent with the highest itness with 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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probability P = 0.9, otherwise the strategy of the less performing parent is inherited. he parents are put again 
in the original population, and ofspring is stored in another pool. When this selection process has happened 
L times, the old population is deleted and replaced with the ofspring. he ofspring inherits only the parents’ 
strategy, while the reputations σ(i, j) are again set to zero: in this respect, we folowed again the work of Nowak 
and Sigmund2, and Suzuki and Akiyama8. On the other hand, models which consider more complex evolution 
mechanisms have been considered for simpler interactions, as for example populations playing the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game in co-evolving networks61,62.
Each new generation repeats the gp game-gossip phases, ater which another reproduction stage takes place. he simulation goes on for t generations, until a inal steady coniguration is reached by the system. Depending 
on the parameter values chosen, the number of generations needed to reach such inal state can go from ten to 
about one hundred.
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